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在寡头竞争的市场环境里,相互竞争的企业通常会与竞争对手建立连接,从而影响他们在产品市场上竞争的方式。本文我们建立两阶段博弈模型研究企业建立连接的激励以及由此而形成的网络结构形态。在博弈的第一期,具有纵向差异化的企业决定是否与其竞争对手建立连接;企业观察到连接结果后在第二期进行价格竞争。本文的分析显示均衡网络结构与连接效应、连接成本和消费者偏好有关,均衡网络可能仅是一个企业与其它所有企业建立连接的星型网络结构,也可能是没有任何企业建立连接的空网络结构。本文还分析了均衡网络和社会有效网络之间的关系,发现均衡网络和社会有效网络并不总是一致的,从社会计划者的角度看,企业建立连接可能存在激励不足,因此公共政策应该鼓励企业建立连接。
In an oligopolistic marketplace, competing firms often establish connections with their competitors, thereby affecting how they compete in the product market. In this paper, we establish a two-stage game model to study the incentive of enterprises to establish connections and the resulting network structure. In the first phase of the game, vertically-differentiated firms decide whether or not to establish a connection with their competitors; firms observe the price competition in the second phase after the connection. The analysis of this paper shows that the equilibrium network structure is related to the connection effect, connection cost and consumer preference. The balanced network may be only a star network structure in which one enterprise establishes connection with all other enterprises, or may be an empty network structure without any establishment connection . The paper also analyzes the relationship between equilibrium networks and socially effective networks and finds that equilibrium networks and socially effective networks are not always consistent. From a social planner’s point of view, there may be insufficient incentives for enterprises to establish connections, so public policies should encourage Business to establish a connection.