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文章追溯了作为一种特别的对物权的财产权概念在英美法理论中的衰亡,以及财产权只是特定资源的一系列利用权的集合的观点在现代法律经济学中的兴起。文章的第一部分,指出了财产权的对物维度在学术讨论中消失的事实。文章的第二部分,回顾了财产权的传统概念以及法律现实主义者对于财产权是一个“权利束”的另一种解释的鼓吹。在这个基础上,第三部分重新审视了科斯的经典论文,力求揭示所暗含的支撑其理论的财产权概念,认为科斯采纳了法律现实主义者偏爱的“权利束”财产权概念的一个极端版本。随后的第四部分,选择性地评述了后科斯主义法律经济学者对财产权的各种论述,发现“使用的序列”的概念贯穿于始终。第五部分,简要地考察了承认财产权的对物维度能够有助于法律经济学者更好地解释财产权问题的几个方面。第六部分总结全文。
The essay traces the rise of modern notion of the notion of property as a special metaphysical right in the theory of common law, the decay of the theory of common law, and the collection of a series of usufruct rights, whose property rights are only specific resources. The first part of the article points out the fact that the object dimension of property rights disappears in the academic discussion. The second part of the article reviews the traditional conception of property rights and the advocacy of legal realism by another interpretation of property rights as a “bundle of rights.” On this basis, the third part re-examines Coase's classic essay and seeks to reveal the implicit concept of property rights that underlie his theory. He argues that Coase adopted an extreme version of the concept of property rights favored by legal realists . The forth part, which selectively comments on various discourses of property rights of the post-Kosovar legal economists, finds that the concept of “sequence used” runs through it. The fifth part briefly reviews several aspects of the object dimension that admits property rights that can help legal economists better explain property rights issues. The sixth part concludes the full text.