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针对由多个风险中性供应商和单个损失厌恶组装商构成的组装供应链.给出了批发价格契约下各节点企业的均衡策略,发现组装商的最优订货量小于集中化决策下的最优订货量.在此基础上,数值分析表明:当零部件种类数给定时,组装商损失厌恶系数越大,组装商的最优订货量越低;并且随着零部件种类数的增加,组装商损失厌恶系数对组装商的最优订货量的影响程度增大.当组装商损失厌恶系数给定时,零部件种类数越多,组装商的最优订货量也越低;并且随着组装商损失厌恶系数的增加,零部件种类数对组装商的最优订货量的影响程度也增大.引入价格补贴策略设计了协调契约,并通过数值分析,对协调契约的有效性进行了验证.
Aiming at the assembly supply chain composed of multiple risk-neutral suppliers and a single loss-averse assembler, the equilibrium strategy of each node under the wholesale price contract is given, and the optimal ordering quantity of assemblers is found to be smaller than that under the centralized decision On the basis of this, the numerical analysis shows that when the number of components is given, the bigger the assembler’s loss aversion coefficient is, the lower the optimal order quantity of assembler is. And with the increase of the number of parts and components, The effect of loss-of-merchant-aversion coefficient on the optimal order quantity of the assembler increases.When the assembler’s loss aversion coefficient is given, the more the number of parts and components, the lower the optimal order quantity of the assembler; and as the assembler The increasing of loss aversion coefficient and the influence of the number of parts and components on the optimal ordering quantity of assemblers also increase.Considering the price subsidy strategy, a coordination contract is designed and the validity of the coordination contract is verified by numerical analysis.