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本文通过对日本和中国的观察和比较,分析了不同制度环境中影响政府议价能力的因素,论述了相对于民间更强的政府议价能力与高速增长“奇迹”之间的关系。只有泛利性政府而不是掠夺性政府,具备了强的议价能力,才有可能在由后发展经济向工业化经济转变的特定发展阶段,带来高的增长率。在此基础上,本文还广泛讨论了特定制度环境中政府泛利性的来源、政府因与生产者结盟而为特殊利益集团俘获、在解决“后发展”问题之后面临“发展后”问题的困境、发展导向型模式的历史终结等问题。
Through the observation and comparison of Japan and China, this paper analyzes the factors that affect the bargaining power of the government in different institutional environments, and discusses the relationship between the stronger bargaining power of the government and the “miracle” of rapid growth relative to the private sector. Only a pan-profit government, not a predatory government, with strong bargaining power will it be possible to bring about a high rate of growth in the specific stage of development from a post-development economy to an industrialized economy. On this basis, this article also extensively discusses the source of the government’s pan-profit in a given institutional environment. The government, captured by special interest groups because of alliance with producers, faces the problem of “post-development ”The plight of the problem, the end of the history of the development-oriented model and other issues.