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在供应链联合促销中,双边道德风险的存在使得供应商和销售商双方都有强烈的“搭便车”激励,而合理的利益分配对促进合作双方积极投入具有重要作用.运用纳什谈判解,构造了供应链联合促销的相互激励模型,并考察了最优线性合约的存在性.研究表明:在合作能产生净剩余的条件下,存在最优的批发价格使渠道收益达到极大;尽管谈判能力对最优批发价格没有影响,但合作收益在双方之间的分配却依赖于各自具有的谈判能力.研究指出:各方分得的合作剩余与自身的谈判能力成正比,与对方的谈判能力成反比.
In the joint supply chain promotion, the existence of bilateral moral hazard makes the supplier and the seller both have a strong “free riding” incentive, and the reasonable profit distribution plays an important role in promoting the active participation of both parties. , Constructs a mutual incentive model of joint supply chain promotion and examines the existence of the optimal linear contract.The results show that under the condition that the cooperation can produce net surplus, the optimal wholesale price maximizes the channel revenue. The ability to negotiate has no effect on the optimal wholesale price, but the distribution of the cooperative benefits depends on their respective bargaining power. The study shows that: the surplus of cooperation enjoyed by all parties is directly proportional to their ability to negotiate with each other, The ability is inversely proportional.