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“弗雷格—盖奇问题”对元伦理学中的表示论者所试图捍卫的准实在论立场提出了挑战。为了化解自身的压力,布莱克本先后采取了两个解决方案,以便处理“道德假言推理是否可以合法使用类似于逻辑有效性那样的规则”这样一个问题。但是,这两个方案都是不成功的。布莱克本因此就陷入了一系列困境之中。表示论者要想走出这个困境,或许就必须避免步入“弗雷格—盖奇问题”所预设的理论圈套,转而赋予人类心理本身以某种解释上的优先性。
The Frege-Gage Problem poses a challenge to the quasi-realist position that telnetists in meta-ethics seek to defend. In order to resolve their own pressure, Blackburn has adopted two solutions in order to deal with such a question as “whether the moral hypothesis reasoning can legitimately use rules similar to logic validity”. However, both programs are unsuccessful. Blackburn therefore fell into a series of difficulties. To show that the theorist wants to get out of this dilemma, perhaps he must avoid going into the theoretical trap set by Frege Gage and turn it into giving some sort of explanatory priority to the human psychology itself.