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检查监督机构与行政职员之间存在监管与被监管,规范与被规范的关系,导致他们的决策行为相互影响,这是一个博弈过程。文章用博弈论的方法在完全信息条件下,对职员与监管部门的博弈进行了分析,其结论是职员要达到自身效用最大化,关键在于“纪审部”最优的监督概率p*,而p*决定于职员的不道德收入(Fj)和不道德成本(Px)。
It is a game process to inspect the relationship between supervising and supervising agencies and administrative staff in the aspects of supervision and regulation, standardization and regulated relations, and their decision-making behaviors interacting with each other. The article analyzes the game between staff and regulatory authorities under the condition of complete information under the condition of complete information. The conclusion is that the staff should achieve the maximization of their own utility. The key lies in the optimal supervision probability p * , While p * is determined by the employee’s unethical earnings (Fj) and unethical costs (Px).