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本文从最终控制人角度,利用中国A股市场2004～2009年的7146个公司年数据对最终控制人特征与会计稳健性之间的关系进行了检验,并进一步探讨了中国上市公司中会计稳健性存在的根本动因。基于经验证据我们发现,会计稳健性在我国资本市场上伴随着控制权私利的存在而存在,并且最终控制人为了掩盖其“掏空”行为,会利用稳健的会计信息来实现其所获得的控制权私利。研究结果表明,在我国资本市场中,会计稳健性并不能作为一种有效的公司治理机制加强投资者保护。
This paper examines the relationship between the ultimate controller and the accounting conservatism using the data of 7146 companies in China’s A-share market from 2004 to 2009 from the perspective of the ultimate controller, and further explores the accounting conservatism in Chinese listed companies The root causes of existence. Based on the empirical evidence, we find that the conservatism of accounting exists in the capital market of our country with the existence of the private interest of control, and eventually the controller will use the steady accounting information to realize its acquisition in order to cover up its “hollowing out” The private interests of control. The results show that in China’s capital market, accounting conservatism can not be an effective corporate governance mechanism to strengthen investor protection.