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高可用度运行是关键设备系统运营企业产生收益的根本保障。为了减小因小概率突发故障造成的严重收益损失以及可能地继发资金流风险,既要设计合理的服务合同增强对服务供应商的激励,又要同时考虑收益损失减缓策略。基于性能合同(PBC)是根据服务结果给予补偿的新兴激励合同,而购买营业中断保险(BI)是减缓关键设备故障继发资金流风险的有效策略。本文以委托-代理理论为建模框架,研究BI保险与PBC合同集成设计模型,探讨购买保险与否两种情景下的PBC合同最优设计和供应商的最优服务能力决策,分析BI保险决策对PBC合同设计方案的影响规律,调查运营商购买BI保险的决策条件。该成果是维修服务运作与金融保险领域跨界研究的首次尝试,其理论分析结果有助于为关键设备运营企业跨部门决策提供指导。
High availability operation is the fundamental guarantee for the revenue generated by key equipment and system operators. In order to reduce the serious loss of profit due to small probability of sudden failure and possibly secondary the cash flow risk, it is necessary to design a reasonable service contract to enhance the incentive to service providers, while taking into account the profit loss mitigation strategy. Performance-based contracts (PBCs) are emerging incentive contracts that are compensated based on service outcomes, and buying BI is an effective strategy to mitigate the risk of secondary cash flow from critical equipment failures. This paper studies the integrated design model of BI insurance and PBC contract using the principal-agent theory as the modeling framework, discusses the optimal design of PBC contract and the optimal service ability decision of the supplier in the two situations of insurance purchase, and analyzes the policy of BI insurance On the impact of PBC contract design plan to investigate the operator to buy BI insurance decision-making conditions. The result is the first attempt to track the operation of services and cross-border research in the field of finance and insurance. The results of theoretical analysis can help guide the cross-departmental decision-making of key equipment operators.