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考虑契约承诺成本就能改变供应链协调模型的均衡。假如承诺成本足够高,确定性和非确定性承诺策略都使得单边支付成为唯一稳定的非严格占优均衡;当排除了不完全信息和导致单边支付的外在约束之后,非相容性承诺则是分歧产生的原因。以OEM下由互补性供应商单组装商组成的典型供应链为例,得到了基于供应商之间最优反应的回购契约并允许加上再协商的契约协调机制可极大改善成员福利并达成唯一稳定均衡的结论,并用数值算例予以了印证。
Considering the contractual commitment cost can change the equilibrium of supply chain coordination model. If the commitment cost is high enough, both the deterministic and the non-deterministic commitment strategies make unilateral payment the only stable non-strictly dominant equilibrium; when the incomplete information and the unilateral constraints that lead to unilateral payment are excluded, the incompatibility Commitment is the reason for the differences. Taking a typical supply chain consisting of a single assembler of complementary suppliers under an OEM as an example, a contractual reconciliation mechanism based on an optimal reaction between suppliers is obtained, and a contractual reconciliation mechanism that allows for renegotiation can greatly improve the welfare of members The only stable and balanced conclusion is reached and verified by a numerical example.