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Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao paid a visit to North Korea from July 25 to 28 in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Korean War truce. The outside world saw the trip as a move by Beijing to renew relations with Pyongyang. But in fact， Li’s trip represents another attempt to promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula， demonstrating China’s resolution to maintain regional peace and stability.
Historic juncture
The situation on the Korean Peninsula has seen ups and downs in the first half of 2013. At the beginning of the year， the UN Security Council issued Resolution 2087 to impose sanctions on Pyongyang， claiming that North Korea’s satellite launch at the end of 2012 violated Security Council resolutions that forbid Pyongyang from using ballistic missile technology for any launch. Pyongyang then conducted its third nuclear test on February 12 in protest， attempting to safeguard its right to develop space technology.
However， the third nuclear test by North Korea ushered in a new stage of the nuclear dilemma. Pyongyang announced that it has successfully mastered technology for the pro- duction of smaller and lighter atomic bombs， posing a nuclear threat to U.S. military bases in Japan and even the U.S. mainland. Hence， the risk of military confrontation between North Korea and the United States escalated.
On March 7， the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2094， imposing tougher sanctions on Pyongyang as punishment for its third nuclear test. Shortly afterward， Washington announced it would send its new B-52 bomber to join U.S.-South Korean joint military drills. During one such naval drill in May， Washington even sent its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz， one of the largest warships in the world， to South Korea’s eastern coast， where the drills were held. Pyongyang countered with a characteristically threatening statement， announcing the withdrawal of the truce agreement and positioning its missiles for a counterattack. The peninsula was once again on the verge of war.
The third nuclear test of North Korea has in a sense brought the peninsula to a new crossroad. There remains little hope for reconciliation between Seoul and Pyongyang 60 years after the Korean War truce， and an arms race between the two is escalating. Support for the development of nuclear arms is also increasing in South Korea and Japan. Though South Korean President Park Geun Hye called for building trust with North Korea during her trip to the United States， there is no indication that the situation on the peninsula is returning to the right track. Channel for dialogue
To break the pattern of confrontation， one of China’s diplomatic steps is to establish a new type of relations between major powers with the United States， thus building a Sino-U.S. cooperative framework that minimizes the Cold War factor. On the Korean Peninsula， China has also worked to establish strategic cooperation with South Korea， splitting the Cold War pattern at a deeper level. Meanwhile， maintaining close communication with the top leadership of Pyongyang will allow China to positively influence events on the peninsula.
The rapidly changing state of the Korean Peninsula is a problem for all relevant parties. With hostility flaring between Pyongyang and Seoul as well as Washington， putting the nuclear issue on the table for dialogue is an immense challenge. The remnants of a Cold War mindset have been the major obstacle to peace on the peninsula. For the Asia-Pacific region as a whole， the U.S. “pivot to Asia” strategy， which appears to be driven by Cold War thinking， complicates any potential solution.
No matter how we define the BeijingPyongyang relationship， it is undeniable that the relationship of the two is of special geopolitical significance. That’s not only because Chinese and North Korean people fought side by side to defend their countries more than six decades ago， but also because their geostrategic interests are deeply intertwined. The policies of each side will have a great influence on the geostrategic interests of the other.
North Korea’s third nuclear test has not only caused great instability on the Korean Peninsula but also to some extent hurt Sino-North Korean relations. As a responsible power， China supported the UN sanctions against Pyongyang. However， this doesn’t mean that China has changed its position of settling the nuclear issue through dialogue. There will be no lasting peace on the peninsula without denuclearization， and that will only be possible with structured dialogue.
For a variety of reasons， Pyongyang and Seoul as well as Pyongyang and Washington are incapable of holding substantive talks at the moment. Rather， dialogue between Beijing and Pyongyang appears to be the most important channel for North Korea to learn about the ideas of the international community and bring Pyongyang back to the six-party talks.
Taking the opportunity of commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice， Vice President Li paid this visit to North Korea. Li met with North Korea’s top leader Kim Jong Un. He conveyed a message from Chinese President Xi Jinping to Kim and reiterated China’s position on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula， the maintenance of its peace and stability and solving problems through dialogue and negotiations. Li said China would like to push the resumption of the six-party talks and contribute to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula together with all related parties， in a bid to achieve peace in the region. In the meantime， Li noted that the ChinaNorth Korea relationship is entering a new period that serves as a link between past and future， which means cherishing hard-won peace in the past and creates lasting stability in the future. Therefore， a joint commitment to peace and stability on the peninsula is the basis for the development of China-North Korea relations in the future. Strengthening dialogue between the two countries will create favorable conditions for fostering lasting peace on the peninsula.
Outmoded ideas
The stagnation of the denuclearization process rests with several obstacles. The first is historical enmity between North Korea and South Korea. The Pyongyang-Seoul relationship is marked by rivalry. Both sides seek the unification of the peninsula and regard itself as superior to the other. Also， legal and military confrontation between the two has exacerbated mutual suspicion and hostility. Another is the ideological obstacle. As a huge economic gap exists between the two countries， there is little space for the mutual inclusiveness of the two systems， which adds to difficulties in establishing mutual trust. Moreover， as South Korea is an important part of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy， the Pyongyang-Seoul relationship is easily affected by U.S. geopolitical strategy. The nuclear issue is a product of these complicated problems.
At present， the question comes down to whether a peace agreement should be signed or a peace mechanism should be established in return for the denuclearization of Pyongyang. Though the Joint Statement of the fourth round of the six-party talks in 2005 has mentioned negotiating for a permanent peace mechanism on the peninsula， it is a non-binding clause that is not contingent upon the denuclearization of Pyongyang. It should be admitted that Pyongyang’s nuclear development owes to the confrontation on the peninsula. Therefore， denuclearization should be connected with the removal of the confrontation. However， due to ideological differences， it is difficult for the United States to normalize its relationship with North Korea.
For its part， China is committed to helping resolve the issue through dialogue. While strengthening cooperation with the United States and South Korea and enhancing communication with North Korea， it tries to build mutual trust among parties concerned in hopes that the peninsula could establish lasting peace through reconciliation. But to create a new era on the peninsula， it is imperative that all parties abandon outmoded ideas.
Historic juncture
The situation on the Korean Peninsula has seen ups and downs in the first half of 2013. At the beginning of the year， the UN Security Council issued Resolution 2087 to impose sanctions on Pyongyang， claiming that North Korea’s satellite launch at the end of 2012 violated Security Council resolutions that forbid Pyongyang from using ballistic missile technology for any launch. Pyongyang then conducted its third nuclear test on February 12 in protest， attempting to safeguard its right to develop space technology.
However， the third nuclear test by North Korea ushered in a new stage of the nuclear dilemma. Pyongyang announced that it has successfully mastered technology for the pro- duction of smaller and lighter atomic bombs， posing a nuclear threat to U.S. military bases in Japan and even the U.S. mainland. Hence， the risk of military confrontation between North Korea and the United States escalated.
On March 7， the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2094， imposing tougher sanctions on Pyongyang as punishment for its third nuclear test. Shortly afterward， Washington announced it would send its new B-52 bomber to join U.S.-South Korean joint military drills. During one such naval drill in May， Washington even sent its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz， one of the largest warships in the world， to South Korea’s eastern coast， where the drills were held. Pyongyang countered with a characteristically threatening statement， announcing the withdrawal of the truce agreement and positioning its missiles for a counterattack. The peninsula was once again on the verge of war.
The third nuclear test of North Korea has in a sense brought the peninsula to a new crossroad. There remains little hope for reconciliation between Seoul and Pyongyang 60 years after the Korean War truce， and an arms race between the two is escalating. Support for the development of nuclear arms is also increasing in South Korea and Japan. Though South Korean President Park Geun Hye called for building trust with North Korea during her trip to the United States， there is no indication that the situation on the peninsula is returning to the right track. Channel for dialogue
To break the pattern of confrontation， one of China’s diplomatic steps is to establish a new type of relations between major powers with the United States， thus building a Sino-U.S. cooperative framework that minimizes the Cold War factor. On the Korean Peninsula， China has also worked to establish strategic cooperation with South Korea， splitting the Cold War pattern at a deeper level. Meanwhile， maintaining close communication with the top leadership of Pyongyang will allow China to positively influence events on the peninsula.
The rapidly changing state of the Korean Peninsula is a problem for all relevant parties. With hostility flaring between Pyongyang and Seoul as well as Washington， putting the nuclear issue on the table for dialogue is an immense challenge. The remnants of a Cold War mindset have been the major obstacle to peace on the peninsula. For the Asia-Pacific region as a whole， the U.S. “pivot to Asia” strategy， which appears to be driven by Cold War thinking， complicates any potential solution.
No matter how we define the BeijingPyongyang relationship， it is undeniable that the relationship of the two is of special geopolitical significance. That’s not only because Chinese and North Korean people fought side by side to defend their countries more than six decades ago， but also because their geostrategic interests are deeply intertwined. The policies of each side will have a great influence on the geostrategic interests of the other.
North Korea’s third nuclear test has not only caused great instability on the Korean Peninsula but also to some extent hurt Sino-North Korean relations. As a responsible power， China supported the UN sanctions against Pyongyang. However， this doesn’t mean that China has changed its position of settling the nuclear issue through dialogue. There will be no lasting peace on the peninsula without denuclearization， and that will only be possible with structured dialogue.
For a variety of reasons， Pyongyang and Seoul as well as Pyongyang and Washington are incapable of holding substantive talks at the moment. Rather， dialogue between Beijing and Pyongyang appears to be the most important channel for North Korea to learn about the ideas of the international community and bring Pyongyang back to the six-party talks.
Taking the opportunity of commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice， Vice President Li paid this visit to North Korea. Li met with North Korea’s top leader Kim Jong Un. He conveyed a message from Chinese President Xi Jinping to Kim and reiterated China’s position on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula， the maintenance of its peace and stability and solving problems through dialogue and negotiations. Li said China would like to push the resumption of the six-party talks and contribute to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula together with all related parties， in a bid to achieve peace in the region. In the meantime， Li noted that the ChinaNorth Korea relationship is entering a new period that serves as a link between past and future， which means cherishing hard-won peace in the past and creates lasting stability in the future. Therefore， a joint commitment to peace and stability on the peninsula is the basis for the development of China-North Korea relations in the future. Strengthening dialogue between the two countries will create favorable conditions for fostering lasting peace on the peninsula.
Outmoded ideas
The stagnation of the denuclearization process rests with several obstacles. The first is historical enmity between North Korea and South Korea. The Pyongyang-Seoul relationship is marked by rivalry. Both sides seek the unification of the peninsula and regard itself as superior to the other. Also， legal and military confrontation between the two has exacerbated mutual suspicion and hostility. Another is the ideological obstacle. As a huge economic gap exists between the two countries， there is little space for the mutual inclusiveness of the two systems， which adds to difficulties in establishing mutual trust. Moreover， as South Korea is an important part of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy， the Pyongyang-Seoul relationship is easily affected by U.S. geopolitical strategy. The nuclear issue is a product of these complicated problems.
At present， the question comes down to whether a peace agreement should be signed or a peace mechanism should be established in return for the denuclearization of Pyongyang. Though the Joint Statement of the fourth round of the six-party talks in 2005 has mentioned negotiating for a permanent peace mechanism on the peninsula， it is a non-binding clause that is not contingent upon the denuclearization of Pyongyang. It should be admitted that Pyongyang’s nuclear development owes to the confrontation on the peninsula. Therefore， denuclearization should be connected with the removal of the confrontation. However， due to ideological differences， it is difficult for the United States to normalize its relationship with North Korea.
For its part， China is committed to helping resolve the issue through dialogue. While strengthening cooperation with the United States and South Korea and enhancing communication with North Korea， it tries to build mutual trust among parties concerned in hopes that the peninsula could establish lasting peace through reconciliation. But to create a new era on the peninsula， it is imperative that all parties abandon outmoded ideas.