论文部分内容阅读
基于避税行为影响企业价值的理论阐释,本文考察了在面临不同资金需求程度时企业实施避税对资本投资效率的影响以及在此过程中产品市场竞争的调节作用。实证结果发现:避税对企业资本投资效率的影响具有两面性,一方面会因融资压力缓解而减少投资不足,另一方面却因代理问题恶化而加剧投资过度。进一步分析显示:产品市场竞争在避税行为影响资本配置过程中能起到一定的调节作用,即在抑制税收规避代理成本效应的同时能强化其融资效应,并最终优化企业的资本投资。上述研究结论有助于我们理解税收规避影响微观企业行为的传导机制。
Based on the theoretical explanation of the effect of tax avoidance on corporate value, this paper examines the effect of corporate tax avoidance on the efficiency of capital investment in the face of different levels of capital demand and the regulatory role of market competition in the process. The empirical results show that the effect of tax avoidance on the efficiency of corporate capital investment has two sides. On the one hand, it will reduce investment shortage due to the ease of financing pressure. On the other hand, it will exacerbate overinvestment due to the deterioration of agency problems. Further analysis shows that product market competition can play a certain regulatory role in the process of tax avoidance affecting capital allocation, that is, while inhibiting the tax avoidance agency cost effect, it can also strengthen its financing effect and ultimately optimize the company’s capital investment. The above research conclusions help us to understand that tax avoidance affects the transmission mechanism of micro-enterprises.