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本文利用1998~2011年中国30个省份的面板数据,基于似不相关回归模型分析了地方政府间税收竞争与地方公共支出的关系。结果显示:税收竞争总体上会降低地方政府的公共支出水平;政府间增值税、企业所得税与财产税竞争有助于提高公共服务供给水平,而营业税、个人所得税与城市维护建设税对公共支出水平的提升有负作用。
Based on the panel data of 30 provinces in China from 1998 to 2011, this paper analyzes the relationship between tax competition in local governments and local public expenditure based on unrelated regression models. The results show that tax competition generally reduces the level of public expenditure of local government. Intergovernmental GVT, corporate income tax and property tax competition will help improve the level of public service provision. However, the effect of business tax, personal income tax and urban maintenance and construction tax on public expenditure levels The promotion has a negative effect.