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人类学“理想的”认知立场从客观观察者一直延伸到置身其中的行动者。但这一粗略的表述引发了很多问题。从客观的观察讲,体制和形式难道没有取代在证明自己的模型中的观察者的位置吗?参与其中的观察在提出融入良知的理想——这一点不允许它提出他性的问题——时难道不是在限制自身吗?最后,行动者设定了观察者的身份后,难道没有所见即其所信因而无法客观公正的危险吗?最绝对的客观观察者的立场是与不可能达到的主观性所具有的具体的他性(身份)相抵触的,而最彻底的主观性行动者的立场是与不可能做到的客观化相抵触的。理想的理论民族学被行动者的终极本质所阻隔,而理想的应用民族学则被理论的他性所阻隔。在前一种情况下,它成为了“没有人类的人类学”；在后一种情况下,它成了“没有人类学的人类”。本文的目的是想说明,通过将“现状”和一篇人类学认识论的文章相结合的方式,将行动者和观察者结合起来是有可能的。
The “ideal” cognitive position of anthropology extends from the objective observer to the perpetrator. But this rough formulation raises a lot of questions. Is it objectively observed that the institutions and forms did not supersede the observer’s position in proving their own model? The observers involved in proposing the ideal of integrating into the conscience - which did not allow it to raise the issue of his sexuality Is it not restricting itself? In the end, did the perpetrators have no observer what they believed and therefore could not be objectively and justly declared? The absolute objective observer’s position was to be compared with an impossible subjective The specific nature of the sex (identity) contradicts, and the most radical subjective actor’s position is incompatible with the impossible objectification. The ideal theory of ethnology is obstructed by the ultimate nature of actors, while the ideal applied ethnology is blocked by the otherness of theory. In the former case, it became “anthropological anthropology without humanity”; in the latter case it became “anthropological anthropology”. The purpose of this article is to show that it is possible to combine actors and observers by combining “present” with an anthropological epistemology.