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由再制造商和分销商组成的逆向供应链中,再制造商回收的废旧产品数量是与回收价格相关的随机变量,分销商面临的再制造产品需求是与销售价格相关的随机变量.再制造商决策回收价格并向分销商提供合同,分销商基于合同作出反应来决策订购数量和销售价格,目标是在随机回收和随机需求下最大化各自的期望利润.利用博弈论和优化理论,分别得到了分散式和集中式供应链系统下的最优决策,证明了分散式系统中的回收价格和再制造数量偏低而销售价格偏高,并提出了综合三种基本合同的供应链协调机制.最后通过数值仿真得到了系统参数对供应链决策和利润的影响.
In the reverse supply chain composed of remanufacturers and distributors, the quantity of waste products recycled by the remanufacturer is a random variable related to the recovery price, and the remanufactured product demand faced by the distributor is a random variable related to the selling price. The decision-maker recovers the price and provides the contract to the distributor. The distributor reacts on the basis of the contract to decide the quantity of the order and the selling price. The goal is to maximize their respective expected profits under random recovery and stochastic demand. Using game theory and optimization theory, The optimal decision-making under decentralized and centralized supply chain system is proved, which shows that the decentralized system has low recovery price and remanufacturing quantity and high sales price, and proposes a supply chain coordination mechanism based on three basic contracts. Finally, the influence of system parameters on supply chain decision-making and profit is obtained through numerical simulation.