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本文在存在内外部人异质信念的假定下,基于随机过程以及实物期权等方法,构建了内生化控制权租金以及权益或债务市场时机等因素的控制大股东最优融资决策模型,并在使用数值模拟方法对模型进行具体量化的基础上提出了本文的实证研究假设。我们进一步使用我国上市公司2004~2013年的样本数据进行实证检验。研究发现,权益融资相较于债务融资对内外部人异质信念下的市场时机更为敏感,企业的融资决策主要是受到内外部人异质信念下权益市场时机的影响;当外部人相对内部人乐观程度较高时,我国上市公司的控制大股东存在抓住市场时机的机会主义行为,表现为在外部融资中倾向于选择权益融资的方式。更为重要的是,控制大股东攫取控制权租金的行为能够抑制控制大股东在内外部人异质信念下通过过度权益融资抓住有利市场时机的倾向。
Based on stochastic processes and real options, this paper builds an optimal financing decision-making model for controlling large shareholders based on factors such as rent of controllable endowments and timing of equity or debt market. Based on the assumption of internal and external heterogeneous beliefs, Numerical simulation method based on the specific quantification of the model proposed in this paper empirical research assumptions. We further use the sample data of China’s listed companies from 2004 to 2013 for empirical test. The study found that equity financing is more sensitive to the market timing under the heterogeneous belief of insiders and outsiders than that of debt financing. The financing decisions of enterprises are mainly influenced by the timing of equity markets under the heterogeneous beliefs of insiders and outsiders. When outsiders are relatively internally When the degree of optimism is high, the controlling shareholder of the listed company in our country has opportunistic behavior to seize the opportunity of the market, which is manifested in the way of choosing equity financing in external financing. More importantly, controlling the major shareholders to seize the rent of control can restrain the tendency of the controlling shareholder to seize the favorable market opportunity through over-equity financing under the heterogeneous beliefs of insiders and outsiders.