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There has been serious investigation toward de-radicalization program. This is based on the trend that in most cases reducing Islamist terrorists have ended with positive results under this program. However, critiques are emerging on questioning the effectiveness of the program. This article presents an analysis of the Indonesian de-radicalization program and investigates critical issues regarding its implementation in Indonesian prisons. Using qualitative method which combines literatures on previous studies and a series of interviews, this paper argues that Indonesian prisons and its correctional system are subject to reform in order to obtain successful results of de-radicalization program in the fight against terrorism.
INTRODUCTION
In the immediate aftermath of Bali Bombing in 2002, Indonesian citizens discovered their fear that their country was perceived as a part of global terrorist network with links to Al-Qaeda. Over the past 10 years, the scale of fear would only get worse as radical Islamist groups are resilient in their fight and continue to strike some strategic places successively in the past few years. The discovery of terrorist training camp in a remote region of Aceh and recent suicide bombing in Solo reveal that terrorist networks are reassessing their strategy to create resilient and lethal tactics for future attack.1
The radical Islamist movements are not a recent phenomenon in Indonesia. For more than two hundred years, they have prepared to use violence as a means to express their faith.2 As far as Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI)—a leading Islamist terrorist organization in Indonesia—is concerned, it is unlikely to remain as the only terrorist threat, since wider radical Islamist
groups in this country are considered to have ties with terrorist network and continue to grow and provoke threats, terrors and violence.3
This paper examines de-radicalization programs in Indonesian prisons specifically related to the Indonesian correctional system whether or not they have been an effective strategy to counter terrorism in Indonesia. First, it will discuss a pilot study of the Indonesian counterterrorism de-radicalization program in Indonesian prisons. The study is based on two crowded prisons located in East Java, namely the Surabaya prison and the Malang prison. These prisons are chosen since there are at least 20 terrorist prisoners serving imprisonment for terrorism in both prisons.4 Although information and data collected from the interviews are limited, previous researches on deradicalization strategy can be used as valuable secondary resources to support the arguments in this paper. The last section will analyse the implementation of de-radicalization process in Indonesian prisons and discuss the magnitude of success of this program in reducing radicalism.
Building upon an earlier work by Zachary Abusa,5 recent discussion in examining the results of deradicalization program has shown some evidence of positive outcomes regarding terrorists abandoning violence. The decline in terrorism underlines the importance of making a key analysis between the concept of disengagement and deradicalization. The term disengagement is used by Bjorgo and Horgan6 to refer to a process in which an individual or a group no longer engages in violence or participates in the violent activities of the group, while deradicalization occurs when a group or an individual no longer believes in a violent ideology.7 Deradicalization programs aimed at imprisoned Islamist radical individuals would attempt to change their ideologies and eventually allow for their release from prison and return back into normal society.8
In dealing with radicalism, the deradicalization program initiated by the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT—Badan Nasional
After the extensive terrorist cells of Jamaah Islamiyah were revealed, the Indonesian government launched a wide-ranging counterterrorism compaign. The “hard” and “soft” approaches have been used as umbrellas of counterterrorism measures in the fight against the spread of the Jihadi ideology for violent radicalism. Based on Presidential Decree number 46 year 2010, BNPT functions as a central agency that carries out several tasks including: (1) formulating policies, strategies, and national programs on counter-terrorism; (2) monitoring, analysis, and evaluation on counterterrorism; (3) coordination on the implementation of prevention and fighting the propaganda of radical ideology on counter-terrorism; and (4)
The fact that the failure stories are much more than the successful one underlies the implementation of deradicalization program in Indonesian prison. As many of former terrorist prisoners, after his release return to their old ways, become the top of the country’s most wanted list. The Indonesian de-radicalization program defies characterization of the real “deradicalization program”. Within the “Pemasyarakatan system”, what prison has done to counter radical ideology is far from what is expected by the government. At present, the BNPT and other agencies are struggling in synchronizing and integrating the umbrellas of counterterrorism program between agencies especially the prisons. There is no sufficient coordination between the prison staff and counterterrorism agencies. The BNPT and the police focus on pre-trial process including gathering intelligence information in order to break the terrorist network, at the same time, the correctional system does not have a specific strategy to de-radicalize Jihadi ideology, and to prevent and avoid the process of radicalization and recruitment in prison.
To sum up, the solution to these problems requires a reformation on the correctional system as well as its administration to design a global strategy to counter jihadi ideology inside the prison. It would be essential for the prison officers to be involved in the grand strategy of counterterrorism programs including improving and developing the human resources so that well qualified and familiarized personnel will strengthen the Indonesia’s counterterrorism program.
INTRODUCTION
In the immediate aftermath of Bali Bombing in 2002, Indonesian citizens discovered their fear that their country was perceived as a part of global terrorist network with links to Al-Qaeda. Over the past 10 years, the scale of fear would only get worse as radical Islamist groups are resilient in their fight and continue to strike some strategic places successively in the past few years. The discovery of terrorist training camp in a remote region of Aceh and recent suicide bombing in Solo reveal that terrorist networks are reassessing their strategy to create resilient and lethal tactics for future attack.1
The radical Islamist movements are not a recent phenomenon in Indonesia. For more than two hundred years, they have prepared to use violence as a means to express their faith.2 As far as Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI)—a leading Islamist terrorist organization in Indonesia—is concerned, it is unlikely to remain as the only terrorist threat, since wider radical Islamist
groups in this country are considered to have ties with terrorist network and continue to grow and provoke threats, terrors and violence.3
This paper examines de-radicalization programs in Indonesian prisons specifically related to the Indonesian correctional system whether or not they have been an effective strategy to counter terrorism in Indonesia. First, it will discuss a pilot study of the Indonesian counterterrorism de-radicalization program in Indonesian prisons. The study is based on two crowded prisons located in East Java, namely the Surabaya prison and the Malang prison. These prisons are chosen since there are at least 20 terrorist prisoners serving imprisonment for terrorism in both prisons.4 Although information and data collected from the interviews are limited, previous researches on deradicalization strategy can be used as valuable secondary resources to support the arguments in this paper. The last section will analyse the implementation of de-radicalization process in Indonesian prisons and discuss the magnitude of success of this program in reducing radicalism.
Building upon an earlier work by Zachary Abusa,5 recent discussion in examining the results of deradicalization program has shown some evidence of positive outcomes regarding terrorists abandoning violence. The decline in terrorism underlines the importance of making a key analysis between the concept of disengagement and deradicalization. The term disengagement is used by Bjorgo and Horgan6 to refer to a process in which an individual or a group no longer engages in violence or participates in the violent activities of the group, while deradicalization occurs when a group or an individual no longer believes in a violent ideology.7 Deradicalization programs aimed at imprisoned Islamist radical individuals would attempt to change their ideologies and eventually allow for their release from prison and return back into normal society.8
In dealing with radicalism, the deradicalization program initiated by the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT—Badan Nasional
After the extensive terrorist cells of Jamaah Islamiyah were revealed, the Indonesian government launched a wide-ranging counterterrorism compaign. The “hard” and “soft” approaches have been used as umbrellas of counterterrorism measures in the fight against the spread of the Jihadi ideology for violent radicalism. Based on Presidential Decree number 46 year 2010, BNPT functions as a central agency that carries out several tasks including: (1) formulating policies, strategies, and national programs on counter-terrorism; (2) monitoring, analysis, and evaluation on counterterrorism; (3) coordination on the implementation of prevention and fighting the propaganda of radical ideology on counter-terrorism; and (4)
The fact that the failure stories are much more than the successful one underlies the implementation of deradicalization program in Indonesian prison. As many of former terrorist prisoners, after his release return to their old ways, become the top of the country’s most wanted list. The Indonesian de-radicalization program defies characterization of the real “deradicalization program”. Within the “Pemasyarakatan system”, what prison has done to counter radical ideology is far from what is expected by the government. At present, the BNPT and other agencies are struggling in synchronizing and integrating the umbrellas of counterterrorism program between agencies especially the prisons. There is no sufficient coordination between the prison staff and counterterrorism agencies. The BNPT and the police focus on pre-trial process including gathering intelligence information in order to break the terrorist network, at the same time, the correctional system does not have a specific strategy to de-radicalize Jihadi ideology, and to prevent and avoid the process of radicalization and recruitment in prison.
To sum up, the solution to these problems requires a reformation on the correctional system as well as its administration to design a global strategy to counter jihadi ideology inside the prison. It would be essential for the prison officers to be involved in the grand strategy of counterterrorism programs including improving and developing the human resources so that well qualified and familiarized personnel will strengthen the Indonesia’s counterterrorism program.