论文部分内容阅读
基于安全管理上两个著名的理论——海因法则和墨菲定理,我们可以认识到:安全管理中最科学的方法是从大量的事故隐患着手,通过隐患信息的收集、分析,采取相应的对策,以防止最小的可能性带来最大的严重性,这和古人说的“见微知著”、“防患未然”是一个道理。如何才能察觉这些事故隐患呢?对于南航这样的大公司,必须通过掌握和分析各种安全信息来获取。安全信息是安全管理的核心,但往往安全管理部门很难真实地、及时地得到这些信息。究其原因,是由于总部和基层作为不同利益的代表进行博弈,导致信息滞后、衰减甚至失真。让我们探讨一下信息隐藏行为及其与治理结构的关联。
Based on two well-known theories of safety management-Hein law and Murphy’s theorem, we can recognize that the most scientific method in safety management is to start with a large number of accidents and collect and analyze hidden danger information Countermeasures, in order to prevent the smallest possible to bring the greatest severity, and the ancients said “see the micro-known ”, “preventive measures ” is a reason. How to detect the hidden dangers of these accidents? For such a large company, China Southern must grasp and analyze all kinds of safety information to obtain. Safety information is the core of safety management, but often it is very difficult for the safety management department to obtain such information in a real and timely manner. The reason is that the headquarters and the grassroots level as the representative of different interests of the game, leading to information lag, attenuation and even distortion. Let us explore the information hiding behavior and its relationship with the governance structure.