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针对由单个损失厌恶型供应商和单个风险中性型零售商组成的供应链系统,在前景理论框架下,研究了存在缺货损失下的基于批发价格契约和价格补贴契约的易逝品供应链协调问题。首先分析了分散化供应链系统在批发价格契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策,并将供应商的最优生产量与集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量进行了比较;从理论上严格证明了当供应商的最优生产量小于集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量时,供应商不能通过批发价格契约使得自己的生产量为集中化供应链的生产量。然后分析了在缔结政府提供的价格补贴契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策。研究结果表明,损失厌恶型供应商在批发价格契约下的最优生产量可能偏离系统最优生产量,这时政府可以通过价格补贴契约来协调整个供应链。
Aiming at the supply chain system composed of a single loss-averse supplier and a single risk-neutral retailer, the perishable product supply chain based on the wholesale price contract and the price subsidy contract is studied under the framework of the prospect theory. Coordinate the problem. Firstly, the optimal decision-making of suppliers and retailers under the contract of wholesale price is analyzed, and the optimal production of suppliers is compared with that of the centralized supply chain system. In theory, It is proved that when the optimal production quantity of a supplier is smaller than the optimal production quantity under a centralized supply chain system, the supplier can not make its own production volume of the centralized supply chain through the wholesale price contract. Then it analyzes the optimal decision of suppliers and retailers under the contract of price subsidy provided by the government. The results show that the optimal production volume of loss-averse suppliers under the wholesale price contract may deviate from the optimal system throughput. At this time, the government can coordinate the entire supply chain through the price subsidy contract.