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本文基于演化博弈理论,引入独立董事间的演化博弈模型,分析独立董事在彼此间相互制约关系下是否履行监督职能的策略选择问题,根据复制动态方程得到独立董事的行为演化规律和外部奖惩机制下的行为演化路径和演化稳定策略,并探讨外部奖惩机制的有效性。研究发现,独立董事考核津贴与声誉效应是影响独立董事决策的关键因素;由政府补贴与法制因素构成的外部奖惩机制力度足够大时,能够有效督促独立董事勤勉尽责。
Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces the evolutionary game model among independent directors, analyzes the strategy selection of whether or not the independent directors perform their supervisory functions under the mutual restraint relationship, and according to the duplicate dynamic equation, obtains the behavior evolution rules of independent directors and the external reward and punishment mechanism Behavior evolution path and evolutionary stability strategy, and explore the effectiveness of external reward and punishment mechanism. The study found that independent directors’ assessment of subsidies and reputation effects are the key factors that affect the decision-making of independent directors. When the external reward and punishment mechanism composed of government subsidies and legal system is large enough, it can effectively urge independent directors to fulfill their duties diligently.