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排污权交易在限制污染的同时也能缓解对生产所造成的扭曲。不过,目前缺少从企业生产率视角去理论研究排污权交易的经济效率。生产率不仅决定企业生产决策,而且也能影响企业的污染排放。利用异质性企业模型研究发现生产率高的企业会排放更多的污染。如果政策管理者按照“一视同仁”原则为所有企业的污染排放设定相同的配额,那么生产率高的企业受到的影响会更大,社会总产出水平势必下降。为了维持总产量不变,在严格的污染排放配额的约束下,如果政府补贴没有达到污染排放配额的新企业,最后导致社会污染排放总量的增加。如果允许企业之间进行排污权交易,会缓解污染配额限制所造成的扭曲,但是依然没有自由市场有效。
Emissions trading can also ease the distortion of production while limiting pollution. However, there is a lack of economic efficiency to theoretically study emissions trading from the viewpoint of enterprise productivity. Productivity not only determines the decision-making of enterprises, but also affects the pollution discharge of enterprises. Using heterogeneous business models, it has been found that more productive firms emit more pollution. If policymakers set the same quota for all enterprises according to the principle of “non-discrimination ”, the enterprises with high productivity will be more affected and the total level of social output will inevitably decline. In order to maintain the same output, under the strict pollution emission allowance, if the government subsidies have not reached the new enterprises that pollute the emission allowances, the total amount of social pollution will eventually increase. Allowing companies to trade emissions permits would ease the distortions caused by the pollution quota restrictions, but still no free market is effective.