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技术差距是影响企业产品创新的重要因素。在市场未完全覆盖条件下,构建了纵向差异化的两阶段双寡头博弈模型,分析技术差距对竞争均衡时企业的利润、市场份额、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响;并考察在不同竞争类型下企业的策略选择和政府制定政策的差异。研究表明:高(低)质量企业为提高利润水平有加大研发投入从而扩大(缩小)技术差距的激励;政府出于对社会福利的考虑,在Bertrand竞争时倾向于限制技术差距,而在Cournot竞争时则鼓励技术差距的存在。
Technological gap is an important factor affecting the enterprise product innovation. Under the condition of incomplete market coverage, a vertically-differentiated two-stage duopoly game model is constructed to analyze the impact of technology gap on firm’s profit, market share, consumer surplus and social welfare in competitive equilibrium. Differences between the tactics of the enterprises and the policies formulated by the government. The research shows that high (low) quality enterprises have the incentive to increase (narrow) the technological gap by increasing their R & D investment to raise the profit level. The government, in consideration of social welfare, tends to limit the technological gap when competing with Bertrand. However, Competition encourages the existence of technology gaps.