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在演化博弈的基础上对不同情况下的发电侧企业的博弈支付进行假设,分析动态过程,得到了相应的演化稳定策略,由分析结果得出在市场统一清除价的情况下,市场倾向于发展到较低价策略,且大型发电企业在市场中起到相应的主导地位,而在按报价结算时,电力市场有两个不同的演化方向,需要相应的监管手段。
On the basis of evolutionary game, this paper makes assumptions on the game payment of power generation enterprises in different situations, analyzes the dynamic process, and obtains the corresponding strategy of evolutionary stabilization. From the analysis results, we can conclude that the market tends to develop under the condition of a unified market clearing price To the lower price strategy, and the large-scale power generation enterprises play a corresponding dominance in the market. However, when the quotation is settled, the electricity market has two different evolutionary directions and requires corresponding regulatory measures.