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在竞争日益激烈的国际商品贸易市场,越来越多的国家将自己视为一个竞争者,希望通过提高竞争力扩大市场份额、获取超额利润并在长期中获取产业发展优势。在这种现实基础上,经济学家布兰德从理论上证明了政府可以通过单方面提供出口补贴的战略贸易政策来取得竞争优势。本文以布兰德的理论模型为基础,通过拓展模型假设条件发现,倘若考虑该国出口竞争产业国内资本构成的变化,则布兰德的结论将有所松动。从而,本文推翻了布兰德的结论,证明了单方面提供出口补贴不一定是出口国的最佳贸易战略,当该出口产业的资本构成发生改变时,征收出口税或支持自由贸易可能成为最优策略选择,这取决于该出口竞争产业的结构特征。
In an increasingly competitive international merchandise trade market, more and more countries regard themselves as a competitor, hoping to increase market share, gain excess profits and gain industrial development advantages in the long term by enhancing their competitiveness. On this reality, Blender economists have theoretically proved that the government can gain a competitive advantage through strategic trade policies that provide export subsidies unilaterally. Based on Bland’s theoretical model, this article finds out that by expanding the model’s assumptions, Bland’s conclusion will be somewhat loosened if we take into account the changes in the domestic capital structure of the export-oriented industries in the country. Thus, this article overthrows Bland’s conclusion and proves that the optimal trade strategy that unilaterally provides export subsidies is not necessarily the exporting country. When the capital composition of the export industry is changed, the collection of export tax or support for free trade may be the most The choice of optimal strategy depends on the structural characteristics of the export-competitive industry.