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由于特殊的制度背景与市场环境,我国MBO被赋予了国有产权改制的禀赋,较国外存在巨大的差异。在实际的推行中,MBO引发了诸多问题,其中最具争议的是定价问题。已有文献对于国企MBO定价的研究热度较低,近年来呈下滑趋势。本文通过对相关文献的充分阐释,结合对于MBO市场参与方的激励机制分析,为构建优化定价模型的理论基础,并得到了优化的资产定价模型。研究结果表明:优化后的模型有助于改善MBO市场均衡状态,产生产权改革效率提高,企业潜在价值增加的正面影响。当然,本文只提供了一种研究思路,对国企MBO定价的研究空间仍非常巨大。
Due to the special institutional background and market environment, China’s MBO has been given the endowment of restructuring of state-owned property rights, which is a huge difference from foreign countries. In actual implementation, MBO has caused many problems, the most controversial of which is pricing. The existing literature on the MBO pricing of state-owned enterprises is low in research and has been declining in recent years. In this paper, I fully explain the relevant literature, combined with the incentive mechanism analysis for the MBO market participants, in order to build the theoretical basis of optimal pricing model and obtain an optimized asset pricing model. The results show that the optimized model can help to improve the equilibrium of MBO market, produce the positive effect of improving the efficiency of property right reform and increasing the potential value of enterprises. Of course, this article only provides a research idea, and the research space for MBO pricing in state-owned enterprises is still huge.