论文部分内容阅读
基于官员与银行的视角,本文以2006-2009年我国各地市委书记与城市商业银行的对应样本,考察了市委书记任期与银行贷款投放的关系,同时考虑了官员董事这一特殊的政治关联行为对任期与银行贷款关系的影响,并进一步分析了官员董事行政级别的作用。结果表明市委书记任期越长,当地城商行的贷款投放越多;官员董事则会强化任期与银行贷款之间的关系,且官员董事级别越低,强化作用越大。我们还考察了地区财政状况的影响,表明官员任期在不同财政状况下的作用存在差异。我们也检验了样本选择偏差问题,证实了结论的稳健性。
From the perspective of officials and banks, this paper examines the relationship between the term of secretary of municipal party committee and the bank loans from the corresponding sample of the municipal party committee secretary and the city commercial bank from 2006 to 2009. At the same time, taking into consideration The term of office and the relationship of bank loans, and further analyzed the role of officials in the administrative level. The results showed that the longer the term of secretary of municipal party committee, the local city commercial bank loans more; official directors will strengthen the term and bank loans, and the lower the rank of officials, the greater the reinforcement. We also examined the impact of regional fiscal conditions, suggesting that there is a difference in the role of official tenures under different financial conditions. We also tested the sample selection bias and confirmed the robustness of the conclusions.