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1949年后,中央与地方政府权力关系的变迁可以从三个方面归纳:财政制度、人事制度,以及政策执行的模式。然而,这三个方面并非相互独立。建立在对财政与人事制度变迁的分析基础上,我们能够理解在财政激励与绩效考核的双重作用下,被地方政府所提倡、转化或限制的政策的行为逻辑。其中,人事制度和财政体系能够通过绩效评估与财政激励影响到中央和地方政府的互动关系。同时,绩效评估与财政激励引起的政策的选择性执行的逻辑,同样能够强化现行的人事制度和中央与地方的财政关系的模式特征,从而形成了一个内生的循环。同时,地方官员在官僚体系中存在某种程度的集体身份和相互制约的关系。
After 1949, the changes in the power relations between the central and local governments can be summarized from three aspects: the fiscal system, the personnel system, and the mode of policy implementation. However, these three aspects are not independent of each other. Based on the analysis of changes in the financial and personnel systems, we can understand the behavioral logic of policies advocated, transformed or limited by local governments under the dual roles of fiscal incentives and performance appraisals. Among them, the personnel system and the financial system through the performance evaluation and financial incentives affect the interaction between the central and local governments. At the same time, the logic of the selective implementation of policies resulting from performance evaluation and fiscal incentives can also strengthen the existing personnel system and the model features of fiscal relations between the central and local governments, thus forming an endogenous cycle. At the same time, local officials have some degree of collective identity and mutual restraint in the bureaucracy.