社会公共组织参与管制优势的法经济学分析——以公用事业价格听证中的消费者组织为例

• 作 者: 刘大伟 唐要家
• 机 构: 辽宁大学法学院,浙江财经学院经贸学院,
• 出 处: 法商研究
• 发表日期: 2009年04期
• 关键词: 公用事业价格 消费者组织 法经济学 价格听证 管制机构 价格管制 消费者利益 信息不对称 社会公共组织 羊群效应

管制是一个多元利益主体参与的、以信息为媒介的博弈活动。在公用事业价格管制过程中,由于产品性质、消费者利益集团的特点以及管制机构决策运作机制的共同作用,有限理性的消费者个体参与存在着参与不足和“羊群效应”两大问题。消费者组织作为消费者的精神家园和代理人与作为个体的消费者相比,由于它的参与更具代表性、能够减轻信息不对称、实现消费者与厂商的平等对抗,因而能够有效地克服消费者个体有限理性及行为模式所带来的缺陷。

Control is a multi-stakeholder participation, information-based game activities. Due to the nature of the product, the characteristics of the consumer interest groups and the decision-making mechanism of regulatory agencies, the bounded rationality of the individual consumers involved in the insufficient participation and the “herd effect” two major issues . Consumers’ spiritual home and agent as consumers Compared with consumers as individuals, their participation can be more effectively overcome by alleviating the information asymmetry and realizing the equal confrontation between consumers and manufacturers. Defects caused by limited rationality and behavior patterns of individual consumers.