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考虑由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两周期供应链系统,在第一周期结束后零售商储存战略库存控制第二周期制造商批发价格的活动条件下,分别建立了集中式决策、分散式决策以及制造商促销的契约决策的供应链模型,并对三种情况下的决策变量进行了比较分析。研究结果表明:在零售商主导的情境下,零售商没有必要储存战略库存;在制造商主导的情境下,制造商通过简单的批发价格契约无法促进渠道的协调,而在制造商进行促销决策条件下,零售商的战略库存量减少,且制造商和零售商的最优利润均大于分散式决策时的最优利润。最后通过算例验证该模型的有效性。
Considering a two-cycle supply chain system consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, after the end of the first cycle, the retailer stores the centralized wholesale decision-making, decentralized Decision-making and contracting decision-making supply chain models promoted by manufacturers, and a comparative analysis of the decision variables in the three cases. The results show that retailers do not need to store strategic inventory in the retailer-dominated context; in the context of manufacturer-led situations, manufacturers cannot promote channel coordination through simple wholesale price contracts, and manufacturers make promotional decision conditions. Next, the retailer’s strategic inventory is reduced, and the optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are greater than the optimal profits of the decentralized decision-making. Finally, an example is given to verify the effectiveness of the model.