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从博奕分析角度对港口合作条件进行了研究 .首先 ,根据港口产业的特点 ,给出了一个特殊的市场均衡 ,并明确了合作的静态条件 ;其次 ,通过无限期限的动态博奕分析 ,发现市场集中度的降低、信息不完全程度和成本非对称性的提高、市场供给过度以及市场需求的低迷均会给港口合作带来损害 .最后 ,构建了一个不完全信息条件下的秘密削价动态博奕模型 .通过对该模型的推导和相应的数字仿真 ,发现在不完全信息条件下 ,市场需求波动幅度和收益的时间价值越大、市场需求越旺盛 ,则港口合作就越稳固 .同时 ,为了维护港口合作 ,必须制定较长的惩罚期
From the perspective of game analysis, the author studies the conditions of port cooperation.Firstly, according to the characteristics of port industry, a special market equilibrium is given and the static conditions of cooperation are clarified.Secondly, through the dynamic game analysis of indefinite period, we find that market concentration Degree reduction, incomplete information and asymmetric cost increase, market over-supply and market demand downturn will bring damage to port cooperation.Finally, we construct a dynamic game model of under-priced information under incomplete information. Through the derivation of the model and the corresponding digital simulation, it is found that under the conditions of incomplete information, the greater the time value of market demand volatility and return, the stronger the market demand, the stronger the port cooperation. In the meantime, in order to maintain port cooperation , We must set a longer period of punishment