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基于中国铝业公司纵向并购的环境和行为特征,构建“上游寡头竞争、下游完全竞争”的两阶段博弈模型,对纵向一体化的排斥效应进行了分析。结论认为,中铝并购电解铝企业对其他独立下游企业具有明显的排斥效应,但这种排斥效应随中铝在上游部门垄断程度的降低而变弱,而纵向并购在一定程度上缓解了变弱程度。中铝纵向一体化的长远目标是尽可能控制铝土矿稀缺资源,并层层利用上游垄断的纵向排斥效应,最终在技术含量高的铝深加工环节上形成垄断优势。
Based on Chinalco’s environmental and behavioral characteristics of vertical mergers and acquisitions, a two-stage game model of “upstream oligopoly competition and downstream complete competition” is constructed to analyze the vertical integration’s repulsion effect. The conclusion is that Chinalco M & A electrolytic aluminum enterprises have obvious repulsion effect on other independent downstream enterprises, but such repulsion effect becomes weaker with Chinalco’s monopoly in the upstream sector, while vertical M & A to a certain extent eased the weakening degree. The long-term goal of Chinalco’s vertical integration is to control as much as possible the bauxite scarce resources and to take advantage of the vertical exclusion effect of the upstream monopoly layer by layer, eventually forming a monopoly advantage in the high-tech aluminum deep processing.