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机构投资者持股对公司治理的积极作用已经得到广泛认可,然而传统观点认为增加机构持股比例会抑制公司投资、降低高管薪酬,这与近期实证研究发现的证据存在矛盾。为此构建了基于经理人职业声誉顾虑的理论模型,试图为相关实证结果提供合理的解释。研究表明,机构持股比例越高,越能增强机构投资者监督、了解经理人经营能力的意愿,从而确保高能力经理人不会因偶然投资失败而面临声誉风险,这就增大了高能力经理人为公司投资创利的可能性,同时也使经理人能够获得与自身经营能力相适应的薪酬回报。
The positive effect of institutional investors’ shareholding on corporate governance has been widely recognized. However, the traditional view is that there is a contradiction between the evidences evidenced by recent empirical research and the belief that increasing the shareholding ratio of companies will inhibit the company’s investment and lower the executive compensation. For this reason, a theoretical model based on managers’ professional reputation concerns is constructed, which tries to provide a reasonable explanation for the relevant empirical results. Research shows that the higher the proportion of institutional ownership, the more institutional investors can enhance supervision and understanding of the manager’s willingness to operate, so as to ensure high-performance managers will not face the risk of reputational failure due to accidental investment, which increases the high ability Managers create the possibility of profit-making for the company, and at the same time, enable the manager to get the reward of remuneration that suits his own business ability.