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本文从法律史的角度重现了施密特作为法学家的方法论演进过程。早年的他以霍布斯式的决定主义著称,法官须对没有实证立法的案件做出一个“靠左或靠右行驶”式的决定,以维系法律秩序的确定性。但1919年以来的经历却迫使他按照黑格尔的精神将自己的“根本性”决定主义逐步具体化。在破除人们19世纪以来的普遍误解过程中,施密特通过历史分析区分了目的性质体和制度性保障,进而主张尤其在是非存亡的问题上按照当事领域的特有属性彻底解决冲突、确立秩序。汲取法国行政法最新的“制度”学说后,“具体秩序与构建思想”最终成型。由此可见,施密特的法律方法与“纳粹御用文人”无关,而是20余年着眼当世实践需求并与抽象规范主义者论辩的有机结果。
This paper reproduces the evolution of the methodology of Schmidt as a jurist from the perspective of legal history. In his early years he was known as Hobbesian determinism, and judges were required to make a “left-or-right-hand” decision on cases without valid legislation in order to maintain the certainty of the legal order. However, the experience since 1919 forced him to gradually substantiate his “fundamental” determinism in the spirit of Hegel. In breaking the common misunderstanding of people since the 19th century, Schmidt differentiates the target mass and institutional guarantee through historical analysis, and then advocates resolving the conflict and establishing the order according to the peculiar attributes of the field of the parties, especially on the non-existent issue . Drawing on the latest “system” doctrine of French administrative law, “the concrete order and construction idea” is finally shaped. Thus it can be seen that Schmidt’s legal method has nothing to do with “Nazi Queen Scholar”, but an organic result of more than 20 years looking into the practical needs of the world and arguing with abstract normativeists.