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本文分析了巴门尼德残篇中出现的Aletheia这个概念,认为通常在与“意见”相对立的“真理”的意义上理解Aletheia是不合适的。这个概念与“是”、“是者”直接相关,甚至可以作为“是者是”这个命题的主词。在巴门尼德的残篇中Aletheia显示了它的独特性,既是女神话语的一种绝对担保,又在一种典型的古希腊式的论辩气氛中维持着自身的自满自足,为其后的思想开辟出一条新的道路。文章借用海德格尔的视野论述了Aletheia这个问题在思想上显示出来的重要性,并试图将“是者是”这个命题所道出的“同一性”摆置到其源出的位置上去。
This essay analyzes the concept of Aletheia appearing in Parmenides’ essay and finds it generally inappropriate to understand Aletheia in the sense of “truth” as opposed to “opinion.” This concept is directly related to “yes,” “yes,” and may even serve as the keynote of the proposition that “yes is yes.” In the parade of Parmenides, Aletheia shows its uniqueness, which is both an absolute guarantee of the goddess’s discourse and maintains its own complacency in a typical Archetype of ancient Greek argument, Ideas open up a new road. By using Heidegger’s vision, the article discusses the importance of the Aletheia issue in his thinking and tries to place the “identity” which is the proposition of “the person is” to the source.