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针对合作服务中的双边道德风险和逆向选择问题,运用委托代理理论建立了能够诱使服务商如实报告自己真实信息的逆向选择模型。研究表明:给出的契约菜单能够甄别服务商私有能力信息并激励合作双方共同努力;非对称信息下,高能力服务商获得了额外的信息租金,客户因信息劣势而受到损失;在信息对称的条件下,客户给予服务商的分享仅与服务产出对合作双方努力的敏感性相关,而在信息非对称条件下,高能力服务商的分享不变,低能力服务商的分享向下扭曲,并受两类服务商能力比值和客户事前信念的影响。
In view of bilateral moral hazard and adverse selection in cooperative service, this paper uses principal-agent theory to establish an adverse selection model that can induce service providers to truthfully report their true information. The research shows that the contract menu is able to identify the service provider’s private capability information and encourage the cooperation parties to work together. Under the asymmetric information, the high-performance service provider receives additional information rent, and the customer suffers losses due to the information disadvantage. Under the conditions, the customer service provider to share only with the service output on the cooperation of both sides of the sensitivity of the cooperation, and under the conditions of information asymmetry, the sharing of high-capacity service providers unchanged, sharing of low-capacity service providers downward distortion, And by the ratio of two types of service providers and customers in advance of the impact of beliefs.