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在信用债市场上,信息不对称的存在,使得无论是政府信用或刚性兑付下的担保融资,还是市场运作下的信用融资,均会发生事后来看资源无法实现优化配置的谬误:一是无效率项目得到融资和再融资;二是好项目得不到融资和再融资。谬误一造成的结果可能是债务违约、不良债务的积聚和债务风险敞口的提升,谬误二造成的结果可能是成长型企业生命周期的缩短和“破坏性创新”窗口的关闭。基于此理论逻辑的构建,本文在分析我国当前非金融部门债务状况事实的基础上,结合行为主体在政府干预和市场运作两种情景下的博弈形式,探讨了我国企业信用债违约形成的机理,最后提出就如何“使市场在资源配置中起决定性作用和更好发挥政府作用”来解决两类谬误提出对策思路。
In the credit debt market, the existence of information asymmetry makes the fallacy that resource allocation can not be realized optimally, whether it is guaranteed financing under government credit or rigid payment and credit financing under market operation. Efficiency projects are financed and refinancing; second, good projects are not financed and refinancing. The result of a fallacy may be debt default, the accumulation of bad debt and the rise of debt risk exposure. The result of False II may be the shortening of the life cycle of a growing enterprise and the closing of a window of “disruptive innovation.” Based on the construction of this theoretical logic, based on the analysis of the current non-financial sector debts in China, this paper explores the formation mechanism of corporate credit debt in China based on the game of the actor under two scenarios of government intervention and market operation. Finally, it puts forward some countermeasures to solve the two types of fallacies on how to make the market play a decisive role in the allocation of resources and give better play to the role of government.