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为了加强对上市公司收购的监管,我国先后出台了《股票发行与交易管理条例》、《证券法》和《上市公司收购管理办法》,在一定程度上规范了证券发行与交易的秩序,保护了投资者的利益,促使证券市场向着透明有序的方向发展。但是随着新一轮企业并购浪潮的到来,在1993年的宝延风波——中国上市公司收购第一案后,发生了万科参股申花、恒通控股棱光、可口可乐收购汇源等一系列案件。中国证券法所构建起来的监管体系的弊端也逐渐暴露出其在对反收购、信息披露和收购要约等方面的监管缺陷,因此上市收购监管的立法有待进一步完善。本文通过对上市公司收购监管的各种模式和监管规则的比较分析,对我国上市公司收购监管中存在的信息披露、强制要约和反收购问题提出进一步的完善建议。
In order to strengthen the supervision over the takeover of listed companies, China promulgated the Regulations on the Administration of Stock Issuance and Trading, the Securities Law and the Administrative Measures on the Takeover of Listed Companies, to a certain extent, regulating the order of securities issuance and trading and protecting The interests of investors have prompted the stock market to develop in a transparent and orderly manner. However, with the arrival of a new wave of mergers and acquisitions, a series of cases took place: Vanke shares Shenhua, Hengtong Holdings Prudential, Coca-Cola acquired Huiyuan, etc. after the Bao Yan Turmoil in 1993, the first case of a Chinese listed company acquisition. The disadvantages of the regulatory system constructed by China Securities Law gradually reveal its regulatory deficiencies in anti-takeover, information disclosure and takeover offerings. Therefore, the legislation on the listing and takeover regulation needs to be further improved. Through comparative analysis of the various modes and regulatory rules for the acquisition of listed companies, this paper puts forward further suggestions on the disclosure of information, coercive offer and anti-takeover in the acquisition of listed companies in China.