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本文研究了双寡头市场中,生产安全水平不同的煤矿企业对规制标准的反应。结果发现,宽松的规制标准,使得低安全水平的企业缺乏改善生产条件的激励,同时也打击高安全水平企业在安全投入方面的积极性,因为高安全水平的企业更为偏好严格的规制标准。进一步研究发现,对于安全水平同质的企业,煤矿企业总体安全水平得到提升之后,规制标准的有效性会达到极限,此时,单纯依靠规制力量无法在安全生产问题的解决上实现突破。
This paper studies the reaction of dull and stereotyped coal mines to the regulatory standards in duopoly markets with different levels of production safety. It found that lax regulatory standards led to the lack of incentives for firms with low safety levels to improve production conditions and the aggressiveness of high-safety-level firms in safety inputs, as firms with higher safety levels preferred the more stringent regulatory standards. Further study found that for the enterprises with the same level of safety, the overall safety standards of coal mines will be raised, and the effectiveness of the regulatory standards will reach the limit. At this time, it is impossible to achieve a breakthrough in the solution to the safety production problems by relying solely on the regulatory power.