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1939年11月至1940年3月,中国军队向日军发起了一次全国性的反攻——冬季攻势。这次攻势尽管未能取得预期效果,但其准备之充分,投入之兵力,对日军打击之程度,均是抗战相持阶段空前的。本文从1938年10月武汉、广州失守后国民政府抗战政略、战略方针,国共关系及“速胜论”的影响等方面进行分析,对抗战进入相持阶段后后国民政府“消极抗日,积极反共”这一论断提出异议,并具体分析了冬季攻势前后国民政府抗战攻略、战略方针的重大转变,从而得出冬季攻势是国民政府对日作战分水岭的结论。
From November 1939 to March 1940, the Chinese army launched a national counter-offensive to the Japanese army - the winter offensive. Although this offensive failed to achieve the expected results, its preparations for war, the troops it invested in and the degree of its attacks on the Japanese troops were unprecedented in the stalemate in the war of resistance against Japan. This article analyzes the influence of the anti-war strategy, strategic policy, the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China and the “win-win theory” after the fall of Wuhan and Guangzhou in October 1938. After the war of resistance entered the stalemate phase, the national government “ Active anti-communism, ”and made a specific analysis of the major changes in the strategy and strategy for the anti-war war of the Kuomintang government before and after the winter offensive. This shows that the winter offensive is the result of the national government’s watershed in fighting Japan.