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本文考虑一个单制造商和两个互补性供应商所构成的装配系统,当市场需求随机时,制造商采取供应商管理库存的方式来转移零部件的库存风险并决定零部件的批发价格,两供应商需要在市场需求真正到来之前自行决定各自的零部件生产量,并承担相应的库存风险.本文假定供应商存在高成本和低成本两个类型,利用斯坦伯格博弈和纳什均衡研究了当供应商生产成本信息不对称和对称这两种状态下的生产与定价决策,分析供应商成本信息共享的价值.研究表明,高成本供应商在信息对称时的均衡收益大于信息不对称时的均衡收益,愿意共享信息,而低成本供应商在信息不对称时的均衡收益更大,并不会自愿共享成本信息;供应商成本信息共享对制造商和供应链也是有利的.
In this paper, an assembly system consisting of a single manufacturer and two complementary suppliers is considered. When the market demand is random, the manufacturer adopts a supplier management inventory method to divert inventory risks of parts and determine the wholesale price of the parts. Two Suppliers need to determine their own production of spare parts before the market demand comes true and bear the corresponding inventory risk.This paper assumes that the supplier has two types of high cost and low cost, using the Steinberg game and Nash equilibrium study when Supplier cost of production information asymmetry and symmetry of the two production and pricing decision-making, analysis of the value of the cost of information sharing suppliers.Research shows that high-cost suppliers in information symmetry when the equilibrium return is greater than the balance of information asymmetry The benefits and willingness to share information, while the low-cost suppliers in the asymmetric information when the more balanced return, and will not voluntarily share cost information; supplier cost information sharing for manufacturers and supply chain is also beneficial.