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企业集团主要涉及母公司、子公司及子公司其他利益相关者三方共同利益,将企业集团模型化为子公司高级管理人员有连续选择“顺从”和“偏离”程度策略、母公司是否选择干预和子公司其他利益相关者选择支持与反对策略的三方连续序贯博弈。在一定的假设条件下,研究得出和证明了集团成员关系博弈模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,即集团子公司选择边缘顺从或偏离母公司策略的策略,母公司选择不干预,子公司其他利益相关者选择支持的策略,在论证的同时,研究给出博弈实现均衡的条件及现实意义。
The enterprise groups mainly involve the common interests of the parent company, subsidiaries and other stakeholders in the three parties, and model the enterprise group as the senior management personnel of the subsidiaries have the strategies of continuous selection, compliance and deviation. The parent company Whether to choose the intervention and the other stakeholders in subsidiaries to choose the support and opposition strategy of the three consecutive sequential games. Under certain assumptions, the research obtains and proves the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the group membership game model, that is, the strategy of group subsidiaries choosing edge compliance or deviation from the parent company’s strategy, the parent company choosing not to intervene, the other interests of the subsidiary Related parties choose to support the strategy, while argumentation, the study gives the conditions and practical significance of the game to achieve equilibrium.