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本文认为铸币税和经济增长之间存在“倒U型”的拉弗曲线关系,并探讨了官员腐败对经济增长以及经济增长拉弗曲线的影响。理论分析以MIU跨期均衡模型为基础,得出铸币税税率与经济增长之间存在拉弗曲线关系,并且官员腐败对经济有抑制作用。数值模拟展示了铸币税税率与经济增长的倒U型曲线,同时腐败会降低该曲线。实证研究也证实了上述观点,且官员腐败还会使最优的铸币税税率变大。经济增长受多方面因素影响,而本文重点分析官员腐败对铸币税,以及铸币税税率和经济增长之间拉弗曲线关系的影响,从而在经济层面探讨反腐政策和经济增长的关系。
This paper argues that there is a relationship between the “inverted U shape” and the role of official corruption in economic growth and the Lafour curve of economic growth. Based on the MIU intertemporal equilibrium model, the theoretical analysis shows that there is a Laffer curve relationship between the tax rate of seigniorage and economic growth, and corrupt officials can have an inhibitory effect on the economy. Numerical simulations show an inverted U-curve of the seigniorage rate and economic growth, while corruption reduces the curve. Empirical studies also confirm the above point of view, and corrupt officials will make the best seigniorage tax rates. Economic growth is affected by many factors. This article focuses on the influence of official corruption on the relationship between the seigniorage tax and the Lafour curve between the tax rate of the seigniorage and the economic growth, so as to explore the relationship between anti-corruption policy and economic growth at the economic level.