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本文首先介绍对赌协议的概念,指出对赌协议是由于投融资双方欲求合作,但由于存在信息不对称性,无法明确资金需求企业的企业价值,在对企业估值时签订的融资契约,共同设定判断企业价值的标的,以是否达成这一标的来调整双方股权比例。随后利用演化博弈模型对投资方和融资方在对赌协议中的博弈进行研究,最后对于对赌协议的发展提出相应的政策建议。
This article first introduces the concept of gambling agreement, pointing out that gambling agreement is due to the cooperation of both investment and financing parties. However, due to the asymmetric information, it is impossible to define the corporate value of the enterprise with capital requirement and the financing contract signed when valuing the enterprise. Set to determine the subject of enterprise value, whether to achieve this goal to adjust the proportion of both parties. Then use the evolutionary game model to study the game between investors and financiers in the gambling agreement, and finally put forward corresponding policy recommendations for the development of gambling agreements.