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通过对基金市场中基金管理者和市场监管者的行为分析,引入有限理性博弈概念,建立了一个基金市场监管的动态博弈模型,并应用进化博弈方法在模型求解和参数分析的基础提出了相关政策建议:1)市场监管的比例应稍超过某个临界值则可达到最优;2)应降低基金管理者对市场监管要求的临界值;3)应关注监管者对市场中违规基金数量比例预期的临界值,并适时的调整监管力度使得基金群体中违规的比例趋向于最小.
By analyzing the behavior of fund managers and market regulators in the fund market, this paper introduces the concept of bounded rationality game and builds a dynamic game model of fund market regulation. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper proposes the relevant policies based on the model solving and parameter analysis Recommendations: 1) the proportion of market regulation should be slightly above a certain critical value can be optimal; 2) fund managers should reduce the regulatory requirements of the market regulation threshold; 3) should pay attention to regulators on the market in the proportion of the number of non-compliance funds expected The critical value, and timely adjustment of regulatory efforts makes the proportion of the fund group tends to be the smallest.