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本文从委托代理问题的角度实证检验企业捐赠的动机。本文发现,代理成本与企业捐赠正相关,而公司治理机制可以缓解企业捐赠的代理问题,但是,这些结果主要体现在非国有控股的上市公司中。具体地讲,在非国有控股的上市公司中,代理成本越高,企业捐赠金额越高;董事会规模越大,企业捐赠越多;股权越集中、高管持股比例越高,企业捐赠越少。而在国有控股上市公司中,高管持股会抑制企业捐赠。此外,独立董事持股比例以及公司所在地的外部治理环境也影响着企业捐赠,但实证结果不符合代理理论预测。本文的研究有效地控制了内生性和替代性假设问题,为企业捐赠的代理理论提供了有力的证据,也为规范和引导企业捐赠行为提供了直接的参考依据。
This paper empirically tests the motivation of corporate donation from the perspective of principal-agent problem. This paper finds that agency costs are positively related to corporate donations, while corporate governance mechanisms can ease the agency problem of corporate donations. However, these results are mainly reflected in the non-state-controlled listed companies. Specifically, in non-state-controlled listed companies, the higher the agency costs, the higher the amount of corporate donations; the larger the board size, the more corporate donations; the more concentrated the ownership, the higher the proportion of executives holding, corporate donations less . In the state-controlled listed companies, executive holdings will curb corporate donations. In addition, the proportion of independent directors holding the company and the external governance environment also affects the corporate governance donations, but the empirical results do not meet the agency theory forecast. This study effectively controls the endogeneity and alternative hypotheses, provides strong evidences for agency theory of corporate donation, and also provides a direct reference for regulating and guiding corporate donation behavior.