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基于内生视角检验了高管薪酬激励机制与公司投资行为之间的交互关系。以我国上市公司高管薪酬制度为背景,选取2004~2010年上市公司数据研究发现:(1)公司投资强度越大导致高管薪酬水平显著降低。公司投资活动通过公司会计业绩显著地影响了高管薪酬水平。(2)基于会计业绩的高管薪酬契约无法对高管长期投资活动产生激励作用,提高高管薪酬水平显著地降低了公司投资强度。而基于股票和期权的激励机制能够显著地提高公司投资强度。(3)进一步研究表明,当期和滞后期的公司投资强度均对高管薪酬水平产生了负面效应,并且影响程度逐渐减弱。(4)研究还发现,高管薪酬业绩敏感性并没有对公司投资产生显著影响。研究结果说明,目前我国上市公司高管薪酬激励机制并没有对公司投资行为产生治理效应。
Based on the endogenous perspective, this paper examines the interaction between executive compensation incentive mechanism and corporate investment behavior. Taking the executive compensation system of listed companies in our country as a background, this paper chooses the data of listed companies from 2004 to 2010 and finds: (1) The higher the investment intensity of the company, the lower the salary level of senior executives. Corporate investment activity significantly affected executive pay levels through corporate accounting performance. (2) The executive compensation contract based on the accounting performance can not stimulate the long-term investment activities of the senior executives. Raising the salary level of senior executives significantly reduces the investment intensity of the company. Incentives based on stocks and options can significantly increase the firm’s investment intensity. (3) Further research shows that both current and lagged corporate investment intensity have a negative effect on the executive compensation level, and the degree of influence gradually weakened. (4) The study also found that the performance sensitivity of executive compensation did not have a significant impact on the company’s investment. The result of the research shows that at present, executive compensation incentive mechanism of listed companies in our country does not have a governance effect on the company’s investment behavior.