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“街头官僚”理论最早在1980年由李普斯基创立。由于街头官僚拥有巨大的自由裁量权,从而不可避免地导致街头官僚在执行具体政策时受到自身利益或个体偏好的影响,进而导致管理者很难有效控制街头官僚的行为和较难达到管理者的政策初衷。该文把我国地方政府看作与中央政府相对的街头官僚机构,并以当前我国中央政府在调控房地产价格所遭遇的“越调控,越高企”的怪现象来具体说明街头官僚及其机构对中央政府有效达成目的的阻碍及出现这种现象的原因。最后,提出针对性的解决方案,以期对街头官僚的控制问题做出或有益的阐释。
“Street bureaucracy ” theory was first established in 1980 by Lipuski. Owing to the enormous discretion of street bureaucrats, it is inevitable that street bureaucrats will be affected by their own interests or individual preferences in implementing specific policies, which in turn will make it very difficult for managers to effectively control street bureaucrats and managerial The original intention of the policy. This article regards the local government in our country as the street bureaucracy which is opposite to the central government and at the strange phenomenon that the central government of our country is confronted with the regulation and control of real estate prices to specify the street bureaucracy and its agencies Obstacles to the effective achievement of the Central Government and the reasons for this phenomenon. In the end, we put forward some solutions to make some useful explanations on the control of street bureaucrats.