政府管制下处理商选择回收渠道决策的演化博弈

• 作 者: 刘永清 杨青云 谢紫微 曾樱
• 机 构: 湖南科技大学商学院,
• 出 处: 湖南科技大学学报(自然科学版)
• 发表日期: 2016年03期
• 关键词: 协同处理 处理商 回收体系 回收渠道 演化均衡 演化博弈 博弈问题 演化稳定策略 政府管制 废弃电器

伴随回收处理行业的快速发展,建立健全的回收体系已凸显其重要性.基于演化博弈理论研究了回收处理商与政府在回收渠道决策上的博弈问题.探讨了政府与处理商之间的行为选择,通过复制动态方程得到了演化均衡稳定点,并对其进行了分析.研究结果表明:在有限理性情形下,超额收益、成本减少额、额外补助对回收处理商是否实施协同处理是正相关的,而政府通过额外补助将有效推动处理商建立健全的回收体系,以提高公信力的手段来积极达到双赢局面.

With the rapid development of recycling industry, it has become more and more important to establish a sound recycling system.Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper studies the game between recycling companies and the government in the decision-making of recycling channels, and discusses the behavior choices between the government and the processors , The evolutionary equilibrium stability point was obtained by replicating the dynamic equation and analyzed.The results show that in the case of bounded rationality, excess returns, cost reduction and additional subsidies are positively related to whether the recyclers are co-processing or not, The government will actively achieve a win-win situation through additional subsidies that will effectively promote the establishment of a sound recovery system for handlers and a means of enhancing their credibility.