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本文认为预约定价是一种典型的不完全契约,主要原因是交易费用、有限理性、机会主义和信息不对称的存在;并进一步尝试从治理结构和法律干预视角去探寻契约的分析框架。一、预约定价与不完全契约解析(一)预约定价——一种典型的不完全契约很早就有经济学家对跨国公司的转让定价进行研究,并有学者在新古典经济学框架下建立了数学模型。~①但是随着近年不完全契约理论的兴起以及对转让定价协议认识的逐步深入,人们已认识到预约定价实质上是一种不完全契约。虽然新制度经济学者对不完全契约的成因还未达成共识,但无论是以威廉姆斯(Williamson)为代表的交易费用学派(TCE),还是以哈特(Hart)为代表的新产权
This paper argues that the reservation pricing is a typical incomplete contract, mainly due to the existence of transaction costs, bounded rationality, opportunism and information asymmetry; and further attempts to explore the contractual analysis framework from the perspective of governance structure and legal intervention. A. Appointment Pricing and Analysis of Incomplete Contract A. Appointment Pricing - A Typical Incomplete Contract There have long been economists’ studies on the transfer pricing of multinational corporations and some scholars have established them under the framework of neoclassical economics Mathematical model. However, with the rise of incomplete contract theory in recent years and the gradual deepening understanding of transfer pricing agreements, people have realized that reservation pricing is essentially an incomplete contract. Although the new institutional economists have not reached an agreement on the cause of the incomplete contract, whether it is the Transaction Cost School (TCE) represented by Williamson or the new property represented by Hart