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以往我们将马克思的自由观理解为对外在必然性的认识,通过哲学史的考察我们发现这种自由观其实是斯宾诺莎的自由观,这种自由与必然处于二元分裂的状态,还远远没有达到德国古典哲学的高度,因而更不可能是对马克思自由观的科学阐释,反而由于我们将自然认识领域的自由观推广和应用到社会历史领域,从而造成了恩格斯与马克思自由观的分裂,也造成了辩证唯物主义与历史唯物主义的二元分裂。在马克思看来自由不自由不是人与物的关系问题,而是人与人的关系问题,他发现资本主义社会的资本逻辑的必然性不过是人的异化的表象,于是他将这种必然性收归到人自身,即通过对异化的扬弃来解除资本逻辑的铁的必然性,实现对象化与自我确证、自由与必然的统一。
In the past, we understood Marx’s concept of freedom as the understanding of external necessity. Through the study of the history of philosophy, we found that this concept of freedom is actually Spinoza’s concept of freedom, which is still far from being dualistic. Far from reaching the height of classical philosophy in Germany, it is far from possible to interpret Marx’s concept of freedom, but because of the promotion and application of the concept of freedom in the field of natural understanding to the field of social history, the division of Engels’s and Marx’s concept of freedom , But also caused the dual division of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. In Marx’s view, freedom is not freedom but not the relationship between people and things, but the relationship between people. He found that the inevitability of the capitalist logic of capitalist society is only the appearance of human alienation. Therefore, he recused this necessity To man himself, that is to say, through the sublation of alienation, the inevitability of the ironclad of capital logic should be relieved so as to achieve the unity of objectification and self-confirmation, freedom and necessity.